3 moving party must set forth, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." T.W. Elec. Service, Inc., v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Association, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) ).
In judging evidence at the summary judgment stage, the Court does not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence, and draws all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See T.W. Electric, 809 F.2d at 630-31 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) ); Ting v. United States, 927 F.2d 1504 , 1509 (9th Cir. 1991 ).
The evidence presented by the parties must be admissible. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Conclusory, speculative testimony in affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and defeat summary judgment. See Thornhill Publ 'g Co., Inc. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979 ).
B. Discussion
Defendants argue that the act of state doctrine precludes plaintiffs' RICO and common law tort claims as a matter of law. 3 On counter-motion, plaintiffs argue that defendants cannot present evidence sufficient to meet the requirements of the doctrine.
"The act of state doctrine prevents U.S. courts from inquiring into the validity of the public acts of a recognized sovereign power committed within its own territory. " Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 487 F.3d 1193 , 1208 (9th Cir. 2007 ) (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401, 84 S. Ct. 923, 11 L. Ed. 2d 804 (1964) ; Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 605-607 (9th Cir. 1977 ) (recounting history of doctrine)). Under the doctrine, "an action may be barred if (1) there is an 'official act of a foreign sovereign performed within its own territory'; and (2) Cent. Dist. of Cal., 130 F.3d 1342 , 1346 (9th Cir. 1997 ).
If these two elements are present, [the court] may still choose not to apply the act of state doctrine where the policies underlying the doctrine militate against its application. The Supreme Court discussed three such policies in Sabbatino:
[1] [T] he greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular area of international law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it . . . . [2] [T]he less important the implications of an issue are for our foreign relations, the weaker the justification for exclusivity in the political branches.
[3] The balance of relevant considerations may also be shifted if the government which perpetrated the challenged act of state is no longer in existence.
Id. at 1208-09 (quoting Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428).
The principal issue dividing the parties on these motions is whether there is an "official act of a foreign sovereign" at issue. Plaintiffs argue that the acts at issue, though committed by the Nigerian Government Security Forces ("GSF"), were not committed or ordered by anyone with authority to exercise sovereign power; defendants contend that they were.
Whether the acts of low-level military officials constitute "official acts"
Plaintiffs claim that defendants cannot raise a triable issue as to whether the attacks at Parabe, Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 , 1546 (N.D. Cal. 1987 . According to plaintiffs, defendants have presented no evidence that any high-ranking Nigerian officials were involved in the conduct, nor that the low-level soldiers involved had authority to act on behalf of the Nigerian government. Second, plaintiffs argue that even if the acts were committed by "an official with authority to exercise sovereign powers," there must also be "evidence that the government acted in its sovereign capacity," Siderman, 965 F.2d at 713, i.e., consistent with the laws and policies of the state.
Plaintiffs' explanation of the official act requirement is the correct one. The party seeking to (ordinarily by the party raising the issue) that the official had the authority to act for and bind the state.
. . . The burden of establishing the act and its character as an act of state is on the party invoking the doctrine."). Second, the acts must be made pursuant to the policies and laws of the state. The first requirement is easily met where the acts at issue are taken by high-level officials, who have some policy-making authority. As discussed below, however, even in the case of high-level officials, and even heads of state, the defendants may not meet the second requirement if the acts violate the polices and law of the foreign state. In the case of low-level officials, the two requirements intertwine: A low level official has only narrow authority to bind the state, defined by the duties and responsibilities of the office and any specific orders coming from those with authority to establish the policies of the state.
Thus, to meet both requirements, defendants must establish (1) that the low-level official acted pursuant to an order; (2) that the order originated from an official with the authority to bind the state; and (3) that the order was consistent with the laws and policies of the sovereign. In other words, defendants must establish that the acts were taken in response to orders coming down through a valid chain of command. The burden is on the defendant to establish foreign law to the extent necessary to establish its entitlement to the act of state defense. Evidence of foreign law is required not to determine whether the forcible removal of Galu was lawful but whether it was in fact an act of state.
Id. at 653-54 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted).
A case from this district, Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 , 1546 (N.D. Cal. 1987 , also illustrates the proper approach to an act of state defense where the actors are low-level officials. In that case, plaintiffs brought a civil action against a former Argentine general for torture, murder, and arbitrary detention, committed during Argentina's "dirty war" in the latter half of the 1970s. Id. at 1535-36. As part of a motion to dismiss, defendant argued that the act of state doctrine precluded plaintiffs'
claims. As the district court summarized:
Defendant maintains that all of the challenged acts were taken pursuant to the "state of siege" declared by the constitutional government and reaffirmed by the military junta. Thus, defendant argues, he was a government official acting under policies promulgated by the junta, and this Court cannot adjudicate the question of his liability without also passing on the question of the legality of the acts of the Argentine government.
Id. at 1544. After discussing the origins of the act of state defense, the district court determined that the defendant had not met his burden, stating: "plaintiffs allege acts by a subordinate government official for example, the officers were clearly granted authority, appropriately and by those with authority to do so, to carry out an expulsion order. The critical inquiry was whether the officers' actions were consistent with the authority granted them by the expulsion order. See Galu, 873 F.2d at 653-54. Here too, defendants must show not only that the soldiers had valid orders, but also that their actions were consistent with those orders; defendants must show that the soldiers were authorized the take the actions alleged by plaintiffs. They fail to do so.
With regard to the incidents on the Parabe barge, defendants present evidence only of the following:
On May 27, 1998, CNL asked Captain Ita -the head of Government Forces in Delta state -to intervene to rescue the workers. On the evening of May 27, Captain Ita sent Lieutenant Sadiq to meet with CNL. The next morning, Government forces led by Lieutenant Sadiq flew to the barge and platform in helicopters leased to the joint venture. They set the worker free and, according to plaintiffs, two Ilajes were shot and killed and two others were injured by the Government Forces.
Defs.' Mot. at 5:3-9 (citations omitted). This evidentiary showing fails to meet defendants' burden for several reasons. First, it assumes that Captain Ita's orders constitute a valid act of state. The fact that he was a captain, in charge of one state, does not itself establish that his actions were that of the state. by the Israeli army. The court gave minimal explanation, stating only: "plaintiffs claim that Israel's official policy violates international law and also that orders were given to a bulldozer operator to continue with the demolitions even when protestors were present. Military orders are official acts of the sovereign." Id. The court thus indicated that, unlike in this case, the acts were taken pursuant to the state's "official policy," and that the acts were taken pursuant to direct orders. Defendants provide no evidence that the alleged acts here were consistent with Nigeria's official policy, nor do they provide evidence that the alleged acts were taken pursuant to direct orders. According to defendants, through these sections of the EAC, plaintiffs allege that the acts here were consistent with the widespread practice and policy of the Nigerian government itself. Thus plaintiffs cannot here argue, defendants contend, that the acts were not taken pursuant to the official policy and practices of the Nigerian government.
The flaw in defendants' argument is that it equates a history of abuse in one region of a large country with an official government policy. As discussed above, defendants fail to provide any evidence that the acts here flowed from a military chain of command, originating with an official or group of officials with the power and authority to create state policy. Plaintiffs' allegations of similar events are not evidence that such a chain existed. Plaintiffs' allegations may, in fact, eventually prove just the opposite: that there was no coherent chain of command in the Nigerian military, and therefore Furthermore, defendants cannot argue that a history amounts to a policy, because in their motion for summary judgment on the crimes against humanity claim, they argue that there is no evidence of any state policy to commit the attacks on Parabe or Opia and Ikenyan. See Defs' Mot. (Docket No. 1260 ) at 14-15 & n.19 ("Plaintiffs cannot carry their burden of showing that Parabe or Opia/Ikenyan were part of a state policy to attack civilians." "That the GSF was acting in an official capacity in responding to the Parabe hostage crisis and the attack at the Searex rig provides no evidence of any policy of the Nigerian government to engage in [crimes against humanity].").
5 "A jus cogens norm 'is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.'" Rio Tinto, 487 F.3d at 1198 n.2. 12 local bands of soldiers were free to commit, and did commit, frequent human rights abuses. 4 Defendants thus fail to meet their burden of presenting evidence of the first requirement of an act of state defense, that "there is an 'official act of a foreign sovereign performed within its own territory. '" Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 487 F.3d 1193 , 1208 (9th Cir. 2007 )(citing cases). Defendants' act of state defense therefore fails, as a matter of law.
The impact of Rio Tinto
In Rio Tinto, the Ninth Circuit held that the act of state doctrine cannot provide a defense to acts constituting violations of jus cogens norms. 5 The court stated:
Acts of racial discrimination are violations of jus cogens norms.
[citation] The complaint alleges 'systematic racial discrimination' and 'policies of racial discrimination' in Rio Tinto's operation of the mine, and that race was a motivating factor in several of the other alleged abuses. These allegations, which must be accepted as true at this stage, constitute jus cogens violations. Therefore, because 'international law does not recognize an act that violates jus cogens as a sovereign act,' the alleged acts of racial discrimination cannot constitute official sovereign acts, and the district court erred in dismissing these claims under the act of state doctrine. Since the Court has found that defendants failed to meet their burden of demonstrating that the actions in this case were "official act[s] of a foreign sovereign performed within its own territory," there is no compelling reason to reach the jus cogens questions at this time.
Id. at 1209-10 (quoting

II. POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE
Defendants also briefly contend that this suit presents a non-justiciable political question. The Cir. 1990). In Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court discussed six criteria to be considered in determining whether a case is a non-justiciable political question:
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217. Where one of these formulations is inextricable from a case, a federal court should dismiss the case on political question grounds. Id. Despite "sweeping statements to the effect that all questions touching foreign relations are political questions . . . . it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance." Id. at 211.
Rather than attempting to show how, or even which of, the six Baker v. Carr criteria apply to this case, defendants merely make the conclusory statement that "there is ample evidence that continued adjudication of this case presents serious threats to vital U.S. interests." Mot. at 22:8-9. Nonetheless, S. 221, 230, 92 L. Ed. 2d 166, 106 S. Ct. 2860 (1986 ("it goes without saying that interpreting congressional legislation is a recurring and accepted task for the federal courts"). Defendants do not suggest, and the Court fails to see, how the third Baker v. Carr factor, "the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion," might apply to this case. Cf. Aktepe v. United States, 105 F.3d 1400 , 1404 (11th Cir. 1997 (wrongful death claims resulting from a military training exercise raised nonjusticiable political questions because a decision would require "a policy determination regarding the necessity of simulating actual battle conditions"). The Court is similarly unpersuaded that the views of the executive branch are necessary to adequately address the political question doctrine. The policies of the political branches of the United
States in relation to oil production, the conduct of domestic corporations in foreign countries, and promotion of human rights, are clear. As discussed above, defendants fail to show how adjudication of this case might conflict with those policies. There is thus no need for additional input from the executive branch, at this point. Before proceeding further, it is important to note the limitations of the United States' submission. The United States does not herein take a position with respect to whether the defendants are properly held liable for the claims raised against them, or as to any other legal issue presented by this case; nor does it take a position with respect to whether, if defendants are held liable, injunctive relief, or any other kind of relief, is available or appropriate, nor as to what form such relief would take, apart from the judicially-compelled implementation of the Voluntary Principles.
Id. at 2:22-3:2.
Thus, despite a broad invitation to comment on the impact of litigating the Parabe and Opia and Ikenyan incidents in courts in the United States, the Executive Branch voiced only concern with the Voluntary Principles. The Voluntary Principles do not appear to be at issue in this case, in this Court.
As such, and as the Court determined above, the views of the Executive Branch would likely contribute little, if anything, to the Court's analysis of the act of state and political question doctrines.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby GRANTS plaintiffs' motion (Docket No. 1278) and DENIES defendants' motion for summary judgment on defendants' act of state defense (Docket No. 1286) , and DENIES defendants' renewed motion for the Court to request 
